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Abstract 
We examine the relationship between bank asset and informational quality. We use a 
diversified panel of 699 banks from 84 countries and measure opacity (lack of informational 
quality) with rating disagreements between issuer-specific ratings by three credit rating agencies 
6	3 0RRG\¶V DQG )LWFK. Results from panel ordered logit regressions show that poor asset 
quality increases the probability of greater credit rating disagreements. Considering that the recent 
regulatory frameworks require from banks to reduce the worrying levels of non-performing loans 
and to increase transparency in their risk-taking, our findings have important policy implications.  
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1. Introduction 
Banks do not always fully disclose their risks. In the immediate term, banks benefit from hiding 
negative information as they report higher profits and healthier asset quality than the real ones2. 
This reduces capital needs, enables the bank to maintain its reputation or even improves that and 
allows managers gain better compensation and credentials (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 
WKHVHLQIRUPDWLRQDV\PPHWULHVUHJDUGLQJWKHEDQN¶VULVN-taking can have adverse effects on the 
bank and the broader financial system. A key source of bank risk is non-performing loans 
(henceforth NPLs) that increased significantly for many banks during the recent financial crisis. 
To deal with the asymmetric information about NPLs, bank supervisory authorities set new 
disclosure requirements that increase the transparency with which financial institutions publish 
their risks3. On the other hand, bank supervisors have taken steps to reduce the levels of NPLs that 
are preventing banks from operating normally, which appeared to be effective in many European 
countries. An interesting question therefore arises from such a context, that is, whether the 
reduction in NPLs could also improve bank transparency. 
This paper aims to investigate whether poor asset quality prevents banks from being 
transparent by measuring opacity (lack of informational quality) with credit rating disagreements. 
A rating disagreement, also referred to as split rating, occurs when two rating agencies assign a 
different rating to the same asset (issue) or firm (issuer). When a bank is opaque and the public 
cannot assess the quality of the published information, credit rating agencies should disagree more 
about the creditworthiness of this bank compared to other institutions whose publicly available 
 
2
 Niinimaki (2012) describes two methods with which banks hide loan losses. 
3
 %DVHO3LODUIRFXVHVRQGLVFORVXUHUHTXLUHPHQWV³7KH%DVHO&RPPLWWHHRQ%DQNLQJ6XSHUYLVLRQ%&%6KDVORQJ
believed that it is important to encourage market discipline by way of meaningful disclosure of the key risks borne by 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DFWLYHEDQNV´%,6, 2019). Similarly, the European Banking Authority has published explicit disclosure 
requirements for non-performing and forborne exposures (EBA, 2018). 
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information is more transparent. Morgan (2002) introduced this measure of opacity and since then 
it has been widely used to proxy the lack of transparency in banking as well as in other industries 
(e.g., Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008; Iannotta, 2006). Livingston et al. (2007) show that firms that 
experience asset opacity issues are more likely to receive disagreed ratings from different agencies. 
Opacity can have significant implications for any firm and for the financial markets. Opaque 
firms are harder to value and thus suffer from decreased market liquidity and higher price volatility, 
thereby more likely to be subject to greater haircuts and be forced to deleverage (Dudley, 2009). 
Livingston and Zhou (2010) show that investors price information opacity (measured by split 
ratings) in bond yields as a risk factor. Also, information asymmetries can lead to undervaluation 
RI D ILUP¶V HTXLW\ ZKLFK PDNHV LW PRUH H[SHQVLYH WR UDLVH FDSLWDO 0\HUV DQG 0DMOXI 
Morgan (2002) suggests that banks are inherently more opaque compared to other types of firms 
due to their lack of physical fixed assets and the difficulty of monitoring opaque borrowers. This 
creates issues in the economy considering the importance of banks in the financial system. In the 
absence of a government that insures deposits and regulates the bank, bank opacity increases the 
exposure of the financial system to systemic risks such as bank runs. Jones et al. (2013) argue that 
opacity matters even in the presence of deposit insurance because it reduces the effectiveness of 
market discipline. Studying bank opacity in a sample that includes two crisis periods, Flannery et 
al. (2013) find some evidence that banks are unusually opaque during non-crisis periods and show 
that crises increase adverse selection costs when trading bank stocks compared to trading stocks 
issued by other types of firms. Blau et al. (2017) find that bank stocks have significantly higher 
price delay than non-bank stocks, which is partly driven by informational opacity.  
Others, on the other hand, argue that bank opacity may have some short-run beneficial effects 
for the bank. In the bank opacity model of Jungherr (2018), for a given level of risk, opacity 
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reduces the possibility of a bank run (as negative information is kept away from the public), while 
bank efficiency and stability are not maximized under full transparency. Berger et al. (2000) argue 
that differences in opacity within the banking industry help banks to generate persistence in profits, 
relative to other industries.  
Although opacity is important for banks, only a few studies focus on the determinants of bank 
opacity as measured by split ratings. Morgan (2002) investigates the disagreement between S&P 
DQG0RRG\¶Vratings on bonds issued by US banks from 1983 to 1993. Morgan finds that a bank¶V 
asset composition has a significant effect on the probability of a split rating. More specifically, 
assets that are inherently associated with greater uncertainty, such as trading assets or loans, are 
related positively to split ratings, while fixed assets that contain less risk are inversely related to 
split ratings. Iannotta (2006) conducts D VLPLODU VWXG\ IRU 6	3 DQG 0RRG\¶V ratings on bonds 
issued by European banks and finds that riskier types of assets lead to rating splits. Iannotta (2006) 
also finds that the bank equity ratio increases the probability of split ratings, while Morgan (2002) 
finds the opposite in his analysis.   
%DQNDVVHWVFDQLQFUHDVHWKHEDQN¶VYXOQHUDELOLty when their quality is poor. As one of the most 
important elements of bank analysis, asset quality has attracted significant attention globally after 
WKHUHFHQWILQDQFLDOFULVLV%DQNVDUHQRZUHTXLUHGWRUHSRUW LQGHWDLO WKHLUERUURZHUV¶DELOLW\WR
pay. The negative effects of poor asset quality on banks have been discussed extensively in 
literature, such as higher possibility of bank insolvency (e.g., Altman, 1977; Forgione and 
Migliardo, 2018; Martin, 1977; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000), deteriorated profitability (Brock and 
Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009), and reduction in bank cost efficiency (Berger 
and DeYoung, 1997). 
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The analyses of Morgan (2002) and Iannotta (2006) show that riskier types of assets can 
increase the probability of split ratings for banks and Livingston et al. (2007) report similar 
findings for other types of firms. Flannery et al. (2004) who measure opacity with market 
microstructure properties and analysts¶HDUQLQJVIRUHFDVWValso show that bank asset types have 
different levels of opacity. Banks usually hold very few assets that are not risky and can be easily 
and accurately valued. Instead, banks hold risky financial assets and this asset structure may lead 
to agency issues among shareholders, managers and creditors. When these assets consist of many 
loans to small borrowers, monitoring becomes difficult for public investors (Diamond, 1984). 
Morgan (2002) argues that delegating monitoring to the bank is efficient but the bank might not 
always be transparent about the ability of its borrowers to repay their loans. Gao et al. (2019) 
provide evidence that opaque borrowers can have adverse effects on bank monitoring. Therefore, 
lending to opaque borrowers can lead to the bank hiding information from the public either actively 
or passively. In other words, poor asset quality may be associated with bank opacity.   
Morgan (2002) and Iannotta (2006) provide some evidence that rating splits are positively 
associated to bad credit ratings. Bank credit ratings are affected by asset quality (e.g., Huang and 
Shen, 2015; Poon et al., 1999) but credit ratings and asset quality are two different concepts. 
Whereas credit ratings reflect the overall creditworthiness of the bank and its capacity to meet its 
financial commitments, asset quality measures such as problem loans are only partly associated 
ZLWKWKHEDQN¶VDELOLW\WRSD\EDFNLWVFUHGLWRUVDVWKHbank can turn to other sources of funding to 
cover its debt obligations in times of distress (e.g., raise capital). The strong focus of recent 
regulatory requirements on the reduction and transparent reporting of NPLs suggests that the 
effects of asset quality need to be investigated separately. 
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Although poor asset quality is inherently associated with higher risk and it is evident that riskier 
assets drive bank opacity, no study with direct measures of bank asset quality such as problem 
loans has provided evidence of this relationship. We aim to fill this gap by investigating the 
relationship between poor asset quality and three rating splits generated by the disagreements 
among issuer-specific FUHGLWUDWLQJVE\6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK on a diverse global sample of 
banks. We posit that poor asset quality increases the probability of rating splits. Our analysis also 
focuses on whether poor asset quality is associated with increases in the probability of rating splits 
greater than 1. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the empirical methodology, 
Section 3 discusses the data, Section 4 presents the empirical results, Section 5 discusses the 
robustness checks and Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the findings.  
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
2.1 Measures of Opacity and Asset Quality 
Opacity is measured as the absolute difference between pairs of ratings among three credit 
rating agencies4. The long-term Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR) E\ 6	3 0RRG\¶V DQG )LWFK are 
transformed from alphanumeric to numerical values that range from 1 to 175 (see Table 1). Since 
ratings from three credit rating agencies are available, three credit rating splits are constructed as 
follows: 
 
 
4
 The binary measurement of rating disagreement that is used in other studies (= 1 when two ratings disagree, 0 
otherwise) is not efficient here due to the large variability in rating disagreements. For instance, for investment grade 
banks, 30% of the SPLIT 3 observations are above 1 (see Table 5).  
5
 Jiang (2008) and Shen et al. (2012) also use the same transformation of ratings in 17 numerical values.  
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ܵܲܮܫܶ ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ  หܵƬ ௜ܲǡ௧ െ ܯ݋݋݀ݕᇱݏ௜ǡ௧ห                                                            (1) ܵܲܮܫܶ ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ  หܵƬ ௜ܲǡ௧ െ ܨ݅ݐ݄ܿ௜ǡ௧ห (2) ܵܲܮܫܶ ?௜ǡ௧ ൌ  หܯ݋݋݀ݕᇱݏ௜ǡ௧ െ ܨ݅ݐ݄ܿ௜ǡ௧ห                                                                                          (3)                            
Where SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the credit rating disagreements and S&P, 0RRG\¶V 
and Fitch are the credit ratings by the respective agencies in numerical values for bank i at time t. 
The resulting split variables are ordered and range from 0 for no disagreement to 9 which is the 
greatest disagreement between two agencies in the sample.  
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
The main measure of asset quality is problem loans which is calculated as the sum of non-
performing, impaired and other problem loans divided by net total loans. Literature has suggested 
that NPLs are a good indicator of asset quality (e.g., Meeker and Gray, 1987), however, the 
inclusion of impaired and other problem loans make problem loans a more comprehensive 
measure. The ratio of NPLs, net of guaranteed loans to loans before reserves is used as a robustness 
check. As an alternative to problem and non-performing loans, the ratio of loan loss reserves to 
gross loans is used. It is calculated as total loan loss and allocated transfer risk reserves divided by 
total loans and leases, net of unearned income and gross of reserve. Loan loss reserves is the 
amount that the bank keeps to cover estimated loan losses in case of defaults or nonpayment. The 
KLJKHUWKHDPRXQWRIUHVHUYHVWKHPRUHQHJDWLYHWKHEDQN¶VSHUFHSWLRQLVRILWVERUURZHUV¶DELOLW\
WRIXOO\SD\EDFNWKHLUORDQV7KHUHIRUHKLJKHUYDOXHVRIWKLVUDWLRLQGLFDWHWKHEDQN¶VGHWHULRUDWLRQ
of asset quality.  
 
 
 
7 
 
2.2 Regression Framework 
Considering the categorical nature of the rating disagreement variables, we employ random-
effects ordered logit models with time and country dummies in the following form:  ሺܴܽݐ݅݊݃ܦ݅ݏܽ݃ݎ݁݁݉݁݊ݐ௜ǡ௧ሻ ൌ ܨሺܣݏݏ݁ݐܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵǡ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜ǡ௧ିଵǡ ܻ݁ܽݎ௜ǡ௧ ǡ ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧        (4) 
Where Rating Disagreement is the rating split as described in equations (1), (2) and (3). Asset 
quality is measured in different models as problem loans, NPLs or loan loss reserves. Several bank-
specific variables are used as controls. The return on average assets for profitability, the equity 
ratio for bank capital, the cost-to-income ratio for managerial quality, the natural logarithm of the 
total assets for bank size, the natural logarithm of the ZSCORE for bank risk, the intangible assets 
ratio, the liquidity ratio and a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the bank is listed in the stock 
market and 0 otherwise. Table 2 summarizes all variables. Year and Country are the time and 
country dummies respectively. ߝ௜ǡ௧ is the unobservable error term which follows a logistic 
distribution with mean zero and variance ߨଶ  ?ൗ . 
The likelihood-ratio test conducted in all regressions suggests that there is enough variability 
between banks to prefer a random-effects ordered logit over a standard ordered logit. The results 
remain consistent when changing the number of integration points in the quadrature approximation 
used by the random-effects models. In the regressions, only investment grade6 banks are used, as 
inclusion of non-investment grade banks does not produce as statistically significant results. Also, 
regression results for non-investment-grade banks alone are not presented due to limited 
observations.  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
 
6
 A bank is considered as investment grade in the sample when at least one credit rating agency has rated the bank as 
investment grade.  
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3. Data 
3.1 Data Source and Sample Characteristics 
The relationship between bank asset quality and credit rating disagreements is examined based 
on an unbalanced panel of 699 banks from 84 countries. Bank-specific data is sourced from the 
S&P Global Market Intelligence database and macroeconomic data is obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample ranges from 2005 to 2018. Calveras (2003) 
suggests that banks hide more information under tighter capital requirements which makes our 
sample period ideal for this study since capital requirements soared globally after the financial 
crisis. In contrast to other studies that measure opacity with the disagreement between two credit 
ratings (e.g., Iannotta, 2006; Morgan, 2002), we use three long-term Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR) 
IURPWKHWKUHHPRVWUHQRZQHGFUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK7KLVRIIHUVWKH
opportunity for further testing as three different credit rating splits are created instead of one that 
LVWKHQRUPLQUHODWHGVWXGLHV7KHVHUDWLQJVFRQVWLWXWHWKHDJHQFLHV¶IRUZDUG-looking assessment 
UHJDUGLQJWKHEDQN¶VRYHUDOOFUHGLWZRUWKLQHVV in contrast to ratings used in previous studies that 
are issue-specific and rate securities such as bonds issued by the bank.  
Table 3 presents the distribution of rating split observations across the 84 countries in the 
sample during 2005-2018. The observations are distributed mainly across banks from North 
America, Europe and Asia-Pacific. Indicatively, some of the top countries in total rating split 
observations include USA (1650), United Kingdom (605), Italy (391), France (384), Australia 
(363), Russia (348) and Taiwan (320). 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
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3.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4 provides important insights to the rating disagreements. First, banks that have an 
average problem loans ratio above the sample median show a higher average absolute rating gap 
across all three rating splits than banks with problem loans below the median. Similarly, banks 
with more problem loans receive on average lower credit ratings. Also, the rating disagreement 
EHWZHHQ 0RRG\¶V DQG )LWFK 63/,7  KDV WKH KLJKHVW YDOXHV RQ DYHUDJH ZKLOH WKH Uating 
disagreement between S&P and Fitch (SPLIT 2) has the lowest values on average. The Kappa 
statistic suggests that, in all cases, the three credit rating agencies did not make their determinations 
randomly. 
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
Table 5 presents the rating gap distribution for all three splits. Credit rating agencies appear to 
agree around 30-40% of the time, while a considerable proportion of the rating gaps is above 1. 
More specifically, for investment grade banks that are included in the regressions, rating gaps take 
the value 2 or more for 21.8% of SPLIT 1 WKHUDWLQJGLVDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQ6	3DQG0RRG\¶V, 
16.2% of SPLIT 2 and 27.1% of SPLIT 3.  
<Insert Table 5 Here> 
Figure 1 presents the three-year moving average of each rating split for the sample period, 
including the financial crisis and its aftermath. It is shown that SPLIT 1 and SPLIT 3 increase 
significantly during the financial crisis as greater uncertainty oveUWKHEDQNV¶ULVN-taking possibly 
led to more and wider rating disagreements. SPLIT 1 decreases after the financial crisis, while 
SPLIT 3 maintains its high values. SPLIT 2 has been relatively low compared with the other two, 
although it increases after the crisis. Overall, it appears that all three splits have been converging 
closer to 0.9 in recent times.   
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<Insert Figure 1 Here> 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 6 reports the results of random-effects ordered logit models with time and country 
dummies, in which problem loans are used as the main measure of bank asset quality for 
investment grade banks. The first three models include only problem loans as the explanatory 
variable and the three different rating splits as the dependent variables. In the next three models, 
eight bank-specific control variables are added. 
<Insert Table 6 Here> 
The results presented in Table 6 show that the coefficient of PL is positive and statistically 
significant throughout the six models with a small drop of significance for model (5) after the 
inclusion of control variables. This implies that, for investment grade banks, the deterioration of 
their asset quality increases the probability of a greater disagreement between two rating agencies. 
Morgan (2002) and Iannotta (2006) have shown that the asset mix is an important determinant of 
rating splits and bank uncertainty. Both studies find that the probability of a rating split increases 
when the bank holds riskier types of assets. Extending the work of Morgan (2002) and Iannotta 
(2006), our findings, in particular the positive and statistically significant coefficients of PL, 
VXJJHVWWKDWWKHTXDOLW\RIDEDQN¶VULVN\DVVHWVLVDOVROLNHO\WRGULYHEDQNRSDFLW\3XEOLFLQYHVWRUV
and rating agencies cannot easily and directly estimate the ability of borrowers, especially those 
with loans being due, to repay the bank as monitoring is delegated to the bank. Banks with more 
risky assets are more reluctant to be fully transparent. As a result, the inability to correctly value 
the loans of non-SD\LQJERUURZHUVDQGWKHODFNRIWUXVWLQWKHEDQN¶VSXEOLVKHGLQIRUPDWLRQFDQ
lead to disagreements between rating agencies regarding the creditworthiness of the bank.  
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To test the findings with problem loans used as the asset quality measure, loan loss reserves 
and NPLs substitute problem loans in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. As expected, the coefficients 
for the NPLs are almost identical to those of PL as the two variables are highly correlated. It 
appears that the inclusion of impaired and other problem loans does not influence the PL 
coefficients. LLR coefficients are also in line with the initial findings. Five of the LLR coefficients 
are positive and highly statistically significant. However, the coefficient for LLR in model (5) is 
not statistically significant for SPLIT 2. Overall, evidence for the positive relationship between 
poor asset quality and rating splits is confirmed for SPLIT 1 and SPLIT 3. 
The signs of the statistically significant coefficients for the control variables are mostly as 
expected. Profitability reduces the probability of a rating split between S&P and Fitch (SPLIT 2), 
while poor managerial quality is positively associated with SPLIT 1 and SPLIT 3. Surprisingly, 
listed banks appear to cause greater rating disagreements between S&P and Fitch (SPLIT 2). 
<Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here> 
Table 9 shows the percentage point increase of the probability for wider splits when the PL, 
LLR or NPL variables increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile, holding the rest of the variables 
at their median levels. The calculation is based on the coefficients of PL, LLR and NPLs from 
models (4), (5) and (6) in Tables 6, 7 and 8. For example, when PL increases from the 10th to the 
90th percentile, the probability that SPLIT 1 will be wider than 1 increases by 12.11%. The findings 
presented in Table 9 suggest that asset quality is not only associated with rating disagreements but 
also with the extent to which they disagree. It suggests that the deterioration of asset quality can 
increase the probability of greater rating splits even when agencies disagree by 3 rating scales. For 
the effect of LLR on SPLIT 2 that its coefficient is not statistically significant in the regressions, 
the percentage point increase of the probability for all split widths is only marginal.  
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<Insert Table 9 Here> 
 
5. Robustness tests 
As the sample includes banks from vastly diverse countries that implement different 
regulations and are at various stages of financial and economic development, we conduct further 
robustness checks that are presented on Tables 10 and 11.  
 We first run regressions for geographical sub-samples. Table 10 shows the regression results 
for the relationship between problem loans and the three rating splits in USA, European Union and 
the Asia-Pacific region. The results confirm that SPLIT 1 is consistently positively associated with 
poor asset quality in all sub-samples. However, the same result for SPLIT 3 that was found in the 
overall sample appears to be driven by banks from the European Union since the coefficient for 
problem loans is not statistically significant in the other sub-samples. 
Also, to control for time-variant country factors, we add three macroeconomic control 
variables (i.e. GDP growth, inflation growth and unemployment) since both rating splits and 
problem loans may be affected by national economic conditions. Table 11 shows the results of the 
extended regressions from Tables 6, 7 and 8 with the inclusion of the macroeconomic control 
variables. The coefficient for PL remains highly statistically significant for SPLIT 1 and SPLIT 3, 
while the coefficients for LLR and NPL drop marginally in statistical significance for SPLIT 1. 
 
<Insert Tables 10 and 11 Here> 
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6. Conclusions & Policy Implications 
Literature argues that banks hide information from the public when they hold more opaque 
types of assets, which leads to disagreements between rating agencies. However, the role of the 
quality of risky assets in bank uncertainty has been neglected so far. The aim of this paper has been 
to examine whether poor asset quality prevents banks from being transparent. 
Using a diversified panel of 699 banks from 84 countries over the period of 2005-2018, we 
examine the relationship between asset quality and opacity as measured by splits among long-term 
Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR) by three credit rating agencies. We find evidence that poor asset quality 
is associated with bank uncertainty. More specifically, problem loans, loan loss reserves and NPLs 
are found to increase the probability of greater credit rating disagreements. This result is found to 
be robust for the diVDJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ UDWLQJV E\ 6	3 DQG 0RRG\¶V LQ DOO UHJUHVVLRQV ZKLOH
EDQNVIURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQGULYHWKHVDPHUHVXOWIRUGLVDJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQ0RRG\¶VDQG
Fitch. The analysis of percentage point increases for the probability of wider splits when asset 
quality decreases further supports that poor asset quality influences the extent to which rating 
agencies disagree. In several cases, the percentage point increase of the probability for greater 
rating splits after a significant deterioration in asset quality is large for gaps greater than 1. We 
argue that this positive relationship between poor asset quality and rating splits exists possibly due 
to the tendency of banks to hide information from the public because of agency-related incentives 
or borrower opacity.  
Our finding that poor asset quality increases the probability of rating splits has some important 
policy implications. While previous studies show that banks are inherently more opaque than firms 
from other industries, the greater opacity that risky bank assets such as loans are associated with 
should not be ignored. Instead, risky assets can be carefully managed and regulated since banks 
14 
 
are important financial institutions for the economy as they transform risk and create liquidity. The 
recent regulatory frameworks that require banks to reduce their NPLs will probably help banks to 
be more transparent as agency problems will be decreased. Also, policies for greater transparency 
in the way NPLs are reported will likely help public investors and credit rating agencies to value 
more accurately bank assets. This will further reduce the frequency and width of rating 
disagreements and in turn reduce information asymmetries between banks and investors. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
The transformation of credit ratings to numerical values 
S&P 0RRG\¶V Fitch Numerical 
AAA Aaa AAA 17 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 
A- A3 A- 11 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 
BBB Baa2 BBB 9 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
BB Ba2 BB 6 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 
B- B3 B- 2 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC 1 
CCC Caa2  1 
CCC- Caa3  1 
CC Ca CC 1 
C C C 1 
D  D 1 
The table presents the rating scales of long-term Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR) 
E\6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFKDQGWKHLUQXPHULFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ$OOUDWLQJV
below B-/B3 take the value of 1 to ensure comparability across all three 
credit ratings.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics  
Variable Definition Detailed Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Credit Rating Disagreement 
      
SPLIT 1 Credit Rating 
Disagreement 1 
The absolute difference 
between long-term Issuer 
Credit Ratings (ICR) by 
S&P and Moody's 
0.959 0.880 0.000 8.000 3764 
SPLIT 2 Credit Rating 
Disagreement 2 
The absolute difference 
between long-term Issuer 
Credit Ratings (ICR) by 
S&P and Fitch 
0.792 0.823 0.000 7.000 3337 
SPLIT 3 Credit Rating 
Disagreement 3 
The absolute difference 
between long-term Issuer 
Credit Ratings (ICR) by 
Moody's and Fitch 
1.077 0.994 0.000 9.000 3783 
Asset Quality 
       
PL Problem Loans The sum of non-performing, 
impaired and other problem 
loans divided by net total 
loans 
5.607 9.526 0.000 98.830 5150 
LLR Loan Loss Reserves Total loan loss and allocated 
transfer risk reserves divided 
by total loans and leases, net 
of unearned income and 
gross of reserve 
3.261 4.152 0.000 83.837 5393 
NPL Non-Performing Loans Non-performing loans, net of 
guaranteed loans, divided by 
loans before reserves 
5.404 8.545 0.000 90.343 4589 
Bank-Specific Control Variables 
     
ROAA Return on Average 
Assets 
Net Income/Average Assets 0.762 1.600 -34.690 33.814 5366 
EQRAT Equity Ratio Total Equity/ Total Assets 8.808 4.157 -35.043 60.335 5489 
MQ Managerial Quality Operating Expenses/ 
Operating Income 
56.028 20.380 -172.261 380.818 5437 
LNTA Bank Size Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
17.680 1.617 12.457 21.981 5479 
LNZSCORE Bank Risk Natural logarithm of the 
ZSCORE which is calculated 
as the sum of EQRAT and 
ROAA divided by the 
standard deviation of ROAA 
3.121 1.046 -3.682 17.047 5309 
INTANGLIBLES Intangible Assets Total Intangible Assets/ 
Total Assets 
0.820 1.317 0.000 16.808 5315 
LIQUIDITY Bank Liquidity Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 29.709 14.891 0.635 167.913 4977 
LISTED Ownership Status = 1 if bank is listed in the 
stock market, 0 otherwise 
0.536 0.499 0.000 1.000 5520 
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Table 2 (continued)        
Variable Definition Detailed Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Macro Control Variables       
GDPG Real GDP Growth Annual percentage change of 
real GDP 
2.523 3.001 -15.100 25.100 5498 
INFG Inflation Growth Annual percentage change of 
the average consumer price 
index (CPI) 
3.110 3.602 -3.700 59.200 5279 
UNEMP Unemployment The number of unemployed 
people as a percentage of the 
total labor force 
7.002 4.289 0.400 27.500 4955 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 699 banks from 84 countries and covers the years from 2005 to 2018. The ratings have been 
transformed into numerical values as shown on Table 1. Asset quality and control variables are in percentage points (%), apart from LNTA, 
LNZSCORE and LISTED.  
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Table 3 
Distribution of rating split observations across countries in the sample 
Country SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  Country SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
Argentina 0 0 15 
 
Liechtenstein 11 0 0 
Australia 150 103 110 
 
Luxembourg 38 35 28 
Austria 42 30 45 
 
Malaysia 61 18 25 
Azerbaijan 3 6 2 
 
Malta 0 2 0 
Bahrain 12 21 13 
 
Mexico 47 57 57 
Bangladesh 1 0 0 
 
Mongolia 9 0 7 
Belarus 14 16 9 
 
Morocco 4 8 6 
Belgium 67 64 52 
 
Netherlands 54 67 65 
Bermuda 9 9 11 
 
New Zealand 63 44 44 
Brazil 113 85 86 
 
Nigeria 15 39 18 
Bulgaria 0 10 2 
 
Norway 26 14 14 
Canada 49 55 49 
 
Oman 8 8 9 
Chile 49 30 28 
 
Panama 6 25 0 
China 89 77 106 
 
Peru 24 34 22 
Colombia 20 20 43 
 
Philippines 12 9 48 
Costa Rica 2 2 12 
 
Poland 22 16 69 
Croatia 2 12 2 
 
Portugal 44 41 45 
Cyprus 4 5 19 
 
Qatar 25 26 33 
Czech Republic 35 21 28 
 
Romania 4 1 21 
Denmark 57 33 33 
 
Russia 127 71 150 
Dominican Republic 0 0 6 
 
Saudi Arabia 67 58 72 
Egypt 17 15 12 
 
Singapore 41 32 39 
Finland 36 17 17 
 
Slovakia 0 0 7 
France 125 136 123 
 
Slovenia 5 5 29 
Georgia 2 6 11 
 
South Africa 23 22 44 
Germany 90 93 110 
 
South Korea 112 89 95 
Greece 40 34 33 
 
Spain 103 81 97 
Guatemala 9 11 6 
 
Sri Lanka 0 5 6 
Hong Kong 80 41 102 
 
Sweden 56 57 39 
Hungary 13 0 15 
 
Switzerland 28 18 12 
Iceland 0 4 0 
 
Taiwan 137 115 68 
India 94 48 65 
 
Thailand 74 67 83 
Indonesia 24 34 49 
 
Togo 1 1 1 
Ireland 53 40 40 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 7 0 0 
Israel 26 18 17 
 
Tunisia 6 6 6 
Italy 128 134 129 
 
Turkey 33 30 116 
Japan 131 82 83 
 
USA 539 597 514 
Jordan 0 9 0 
 
Ukraine 4 4 21 
Kazakhstan 22 20 8 
 
United Arab Emirates 37 32 83 
Kenya 1 0 0 
 
United Kingdom 189 205 211 
Kuwait 31 26 50 
 
Uzbekistan 17 9 0 
Lebanon 15 9 14 
 
Vietnam 30 13 24 
      
   
     
All Countries 3764 3337 3783 
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Table 4 
Differences Among Ratings and Rating Disagreements 
  Average Ratings  Kappa Statistic  Average Absolute Gap  Correlation Between Ratings 
  S&P Moody's Fitch  S&P and Moody's 
S&P and 
Fitch 
Moody's and 
Fitch  SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  
S&P and 
Moody's 
S&P and 
Fitch 
Moody's 
and Fitch 
Sample Total  10.048 10.103 10.149  0.245 0.344 0.230  0.959 0.792 1.077  0.940 0.946 0.916 
                 
Banks with 
Problem Loans 
Above 
Median 9.010 8.927 9.356  0.266 0.324 0.221  0.966 0.859 1.171  0.940 0.948 0.908 
 
Below 
Median 11.129 11.437 11.116  0.214 0.359 0.231  0.951 0.718 0.962  0.918 0.926 0.911 
                 
Investment Grade Yes 10.417 10.464 10.487  0.227 0.337 0.225  0.971 0.782 1.066  0.919 0.925 0.893 
 No 4.004 3.551 4.579  0.301 0.262 0.127  0.791 0.913 1.224  0.823 0.796 0.776 
S&P0RRG\¶VDQG)LWFKDUHWKHWUDQVIRUPHGFUHGLWUDWLQJVE\WKHUHVSHFWLYHUDWLQJDJHQFLHVVHH7DEOH.DSSDStatistic is a measure of interrater agreement (See Morgan (2002)). Average 
absolute gap is the mean of each rating split. Banks are divided in subsamples of banks with average problem loans above and below the sample median (2.51%) and of banks that are rated 
by at least one of the three rating agencies as investment grade or not. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Rating Gap Distribution 
  SPLIT 1  SPLIT 2  SPLIT 3 
Gap =  0 1 2 3+  0 1 2 3+  0 1 2 3+ 
Sample Total  0.316 0.470 0.170 0.044  0.411 0.424 0.136 0.029  0.300 0.425 0.206 0.069 
                
Banks with 
Problem Loans 
Above 
Median 0.327 0.462 0.162 0.050  0.385 0.427 0.149 0.039  0.288 0.412 0.199 0.101 
 
Below 
Median 0.306 0.479 0.178 0.037  0.440 0.421 0.121 0.018  0.315 0.440 0.216 0.029 
                
Investment Grade Yes 0.309 0.472 0.175 0.043  0.415 0.424 0.136 0.026  0.304 0.424 0.204 0.067 
 No 0.413 0.441 0.091 0.055  0.370 0.429 0.138 0.063  0.244 0.429 0.240 0.087 
Banks are divided in subsamples of banks with average problem loans above and below the sample median (2.51%) and of banks that are rated by at least 
one of the three rating agencies as investment grade or not. 
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Table 6 
Random-Effects Ordered Logit Models with Problem Loans (PL) as measure of Asset Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
PL 0.041*** 0.079*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.039** 0.057*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
ROAA    0.071 -0.324*** -0.193** 
    (0.095) (0.103) (0.087) 
EQRAT    0.036 -0.032 0.005 
    (0.030) (0.038) (0.033) 
MQ    0.010*** -0.005 0.016*** 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
LNTA    -0.112 -0.113 -0.073 
    (0.073) (0.104) (0.088) 
LNZSCORE    -0.268** -0.125 -0.023 
    (0.114) (0.144) (0.138) 
INTANGIBLES    0.041 -0.131* -0.053 
    (0.063) (0.077) (0.074) 
LIQUIDITY    -0.009 0.008 0.005 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
LISTED    0.040 0.718** -0.005 
    (0.199) (0.291) (0.247) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2786 2488 2798 2413 2203 2455 
N. of Banks 380 364 409 352 340 379 
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.214 0.169 0.162 0.218 0.162 
Log Likelihood -2766.62 -2191.8 -2989.82 -2388.32 -1943.48 -2653.51 
SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the dependent variables and each one is the absolute difference between each pair of the three 
FUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK7KHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVDUHDOOLQWKHLU-year lagged form. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
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Table 7 
Random-Effects Ordered Logit Models with Loan Loss Reserves (LLR) as measure of Asset Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
LLR 0.125*** 0.112*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 0.022 0.140*** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.034) (0.041) (0.032) 
ROAA 
   -0.0004 -0.354*** -0.172 
 
   (0.093) (0.100) (0.087) 
EQRAT 
   0.009 -0.045 -0.027 
 
   (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) 
MQ 
   0.008** -0.005 0.016*** 
 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LNTA 
   -0.134 -0.077 -0.065 
 
   (0.073) (0.101) (0.087) 
LNZSCORE 
   -0.183 -0.171 0.012 
 
   (0.116) (0.142) (0.139) 
INTANGIBLES 
   0.044 -0.147** -0.102 
 
   (0.063) (0.075) (0.073) 
LIQUIDITY 
   -0.014** 0.008 0.000 
 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
LISTED 
   0.014 0.688** 0.059 
 
   (0.205) (0.288) (0.246) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2876 2578 2888 2478 2278 2532 
N. of Banks 394 377 420 364 350 388 
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.203 0.166 0.161 0.210 0.160 
Log Likelihood -2878.07 -2315.37 -3135.47 -2472.01 -2036.44 -2776.35 
SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the dependent variables and each one is the absolute difference between each pair of the three 
FUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK7KHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVDUHDOOLQWKHLU-year lagged form. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
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Table 8 
Random-Effects Ordered Logit Models with Non-Performing Loans (NPL) as measure of Asset Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
NPL 0.045*** 0.090*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.048** 0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) 
ROAA    0.058 -0.285*** -0.216** 
    (0.097) (0.102) (0.088) 
EQRAT    0.038 -0.020 0.009 
    (0.031) (0.038) (0.034) 
MQ    0.011*** -0.005 0.016*** 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
LNTA    -0.098 0.006 -0.085 
    (0.080) (0.105) (0.093) 
LNZSCORE    -0.308** -0.149 -0.130 
    (0.121) (0.146) (0.148) 
INTANGIBLES    0.034 -0.149 -0.060 
    (0.064) (0.076) (0.075) 
LIQUIDITY    -0.010 0.008 0.002 
    (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
LISTED    -0.046 0.649** -0.057 
    (0.209) (0.283) (0.256) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2475 2234 2499 2123 1967 2174 
N. of Banks 343 331 372 317 310 344 
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.198 0.165 0.161 0.199 0.160 
Log Likelihood -2472.07 -2024.7 -2710.84 -2120.49 -1793.5 -2383.74 
SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the dependent variables and each one is the absolute difference between each pair of the three 
FUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK7KHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVDUHDOOLQWKHLU-year lagged form. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
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Table 9 
The percentage point increase of the probability for wider splits when banks increase their PL, LLR or NPL from the 10 th to the 90th 
percentile.  
 PL  LLR  NPL 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
 
SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
 
SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
Gap > 0 2.12% 8.74% 15.51%  1.82% 3.50% 20.62%  2.07% 13.64% 9.96% 
Gap > 1 12.11% 4.07% 1.89%  14.97% 0.72% 2.66%  12.23% 1.43% 10.51% 
Gap > 2 2.89% 0.23% 0.15%  5.32% 0.04% 0.22%  3.09% 0.08% 1.19% 
Gap > 3 0.38% 0.01% 0.02%  0.88% 0.00% 0.03%  0.39% 0.00% 0.15% 
The table presents the percentage point increase of the probability for wider splits when the problem loans (PL), loan loss reserves 
(LLR) or non-performing loans (NPL) variables increase from the 10th to the 90th percentile, holding the rest of the variables at their 
median levels. The calculation uses the PL, LLR and NPL coefficients from models (4), (5) and (6) from Tables X, Y and Z. Results 
for Gap > 4 are not reported as those percentage point increases are very close to zero.   
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Table 10 
Random-Effects Ordered Logit Models with Problem Loans (PL) as measure of Asset Quality for different geographical subsamples 
 USA  European Union  Asia-Pacific 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
PL 0.553*** 0.092 0.169  0.030*** 0.002 0.031***  0.432*** 0.214 0.094 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.127)  (0.010) (0.017) (0.011)  (0.145) (0.253) (0.161) 
ROAA 0.261 -0.325 0.516  0.117 -0.196 -0.268***  -0.039 -0.078 -0.272 
 (0.322) (0.322) (0.359)  (0.117) (0.135) (0.102)  (0.497) (0.686) (0.475) 
EQRAT -0.089 0.082 0.056  0.003 -0.109 -0.020  -0.008 -0.340 -0.089 
 (0.066) (0.079) (0.083)  (0.034) (0.055) (0.044)  (0.095) (0.172) (0.110) 
MQ 0.023 -0.007 0.050***  0.006 -0.008 0.006  -0.007 -0.002 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) 
LNTA -0.362* 0.540 0.156  -0.002 -0.321** -0.334***  -0.382* -1.289*** 0.455* 
 (0.188) (0.249) (0.246)  (0.087) (0.132) (0.099)  (0.217) (0.381) (0.247) 
LNZSCORE -0.485* -0.223** -0.691  -0.147 -0.077 -0.027  0.512 -0.005 0.332 
 (0.284) (0.338) (0.436)  (0.109) (0.169) (0.140)  (0.429) (0.647) (0.488) 
INTANGIBLES 0.098 -0.048 -0.096  -0.256** -0.519 0.205  1.336*** 1.170* 0.525 
 (0.096) (0.112) (0.119)  (0.125) (0.170) (0.133)  (0.429) (0.606) (0.482) 
LIQUIDITY -0.023 -0.016 0.004  -0.012*** -0.005 0.004  0.039** 0.099*** 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.018) (0.029) (0.014) 
LISTED -0.858 -0.435 0.499  -0.074 1.232*** 0.257  1.025* 1.324 -1.656*** 
 (0.628) (0.797) (0.885)  (0.207) (0.343) (0.261)  (0.583) (0.862) (0.636) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 418 441 388  854 811 895  703 520 616 
N. of Banks 55 61 52  121 120 134  96 76 92 
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.212 0.222  0.112 0.171 0.116  0.317 0.335 0.303 
Log Likelihood -386.07 -384.01 -359.96  -918.93 -757.18 -1083.25  -545.48 -336.72 -476.14 
SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the dependent variables and each one is the absolute difference between each pair of the thrHHFUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK
The explanatory variables are all in their 1-year lagged form. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
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Table 11 
Random-Effects Ordered Logit Models with macro controls 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3  SPLIT 1 SPLIT 2 SPLIT 3 
PL 0.035*** 0.025 0.049***         
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.012)         
LLR     0.079** -0.006 0.117***     
     (0.034) (0.041) (0.032)     
NPL         0.035** 0.033 0.047*** 
         (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) 
GDPG -0.003 -0.053 -0.010  -0.002 -0.048 -0.017  0.001 -0.062* -0.017 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.028) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.035) (0.027) 
INFG -0.083 -0.021 -0.005  -0.074 0.006 0.019  -0.099* -0.010 -0.011 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.043)  (0.050) (0.055) (0.042)  (0.054) (0.057) (0.044) 
UNEMP 0.045 0.127*** 0.061  0.056 0.140*** 0.057  0.070* 0.113** 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.039)  (0.037) (0.044) (0.039)  (0.038) (0.046) (0.041) 
Bank-Specific 
Controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Observations 2244 2054 2295  2305 2125 2368  1954 1818 2015 
N. of Banks 326 315 349  338 325 358  291 285 315 
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.215 0.155  0.149 0.208 0.153  0.150 0.194 0.151 
Log Likelihood -2254.75 -1814.03 -2506.55  -2336.26 -1903.59 -2626.82  -1984.60 -1663.75 -2238.33 
SPLIT 1, SPLIT 2 and SPLIT 3 are the dependent variables and each one is the absolute difference between each pair of the thrHHFUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQFLHV6	30RRG\¶VDQG)LWFK
The explanatory variables are all in their 1-year lagged form. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.   
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Figure 1. Credit rating disagreements over time 
The figure reports the three-year moving average of the mean of each rating split.  
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